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This paper considers real ﬂight application of a monocular image-based aircraft collision decision algorithm developed in a
previous paper. First, it brieﬂy summarizes the theory based on the previous paper and extends the results with a detailed
evaluation of possible special cases. Second, it introduces the UAVs and ﬂight test scenarios together with the camera system
and the steps of image processing used in ﬂight testing. A brief analysis about intruder detectability is also provided referencing
a more exhaustive work of the authors. The main contribution is the detailed comparison of the image-based estimated collision
parameters to the ﬂight trajectory-based ones together with threshold selection for collision decision. Diﬀerent threshold
combinations are evaluated oﬄine, and ﬁnally, real ﬂight decision results based on one of the threshold combinations are also
discussed. The paper ends with the setup of future research directions.
1. Introduction
Sense and avoid (S&A) capability is a crucial ability for future
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). It is vital to integrate civil-
ian and governmental UAVs into the common airspace
according to [1] for example. At the highest level of integra-
tion, airborne sense and avoid (ABSAA) systems are required
to guarantee airspace safety [2].
In this ﬁeld, the most critical question is the case of non-
cooperative S&A for which usually complicated multisensor
systems (see [3–6] for example) or radar-based solutions
(see [7, 8] for example) are developed. However, in the case
of small UAVs, the size, weight, and power consumption of
the onboard S&A system should be minimal. Monocular
vision-based solutions can be cost and weight eﬀective and
therefore especially good for small UAVs [9–16]. These sys-
tems measure the position (bearing) and size of the intruder
aircraft (A/C) camera image without range and physical
intruder size information. This scale ambiguity makes the
decision about the possibility of collision (collision means
both mid-air collision or near mid-air collision in this article)
complicated (see, e.g., [9] where a conservative assumption
on intruder’s minimum size is used to make the decision pos-
sible but this can lead to false alarms). In another source [13]
where the task is to follow a leader aircraft based on a mon-
ocular camera, special maneuvers are required to provide
range observability. However, [10] points out that the relative
distance of the intruder from the own A/C called the closest
point of approach (CPA) well characterizes the possibility
of collision together with the time to closest point of
approach (TTCPA) and there is a chance to estimate these
parameters without any physical intruder information. In
the literature, there are several works dealing with TTCPA
estimation based on optic ﬂow or ﬁrst-order motion models
such as [17–19]. However, it is hard to ﬁnd references about
the estimation of CPA. For example, [9, 20] target to estimate
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the absolute distance between the A/C the former with the
conservative intruder size assumption and the latter by
assuming known intruder position and relative velocity.
Consequently, previous eﬀorts of the authors [21–24]
focused on the estimation of TTCPA and CPA values
together with the direction of CPA from solely the monocu-
lar image parameters. The only restrictive assumption was
that the aircraft follows straight ﬂight paths with constant
velocities (in these previous works, TTCPA was sometimes
referenced as TTC (time to collision)). Formulae to obtain
these values with forward looking and even with oblique
cameras (see our system in Figure 10) were developed and
tested mainly in software in-the-loop (SIL) simulations. The
proposed simple solution is based on a least squares (LS)
optimal line ﬁt method which well serves real-time execution
needs. Error analysis considering image pixelization errors
was done in [21].
Our latest work [24] presents the theory of evaluation of
the collision situation in three dimensions (3D) estimating
TTCPA, horizontal and vertical CPA, and the direction of
the horizontal one (βCPA) as it is not necessarily perpendicu-
lar to the own A/C forward body axis (see [23] and Figure 2).
The only information lost is the absolute distance between
the two A/C; the relative CPA values are determined instead,
but this information is appropriate for the decision about the
possibility of collision and for the design of an avoidance
maneuver. SIL test results are presented, but in-ﬂight testing
of such methods is also very important as underlined by
[4, 13] for example.
So, the main goal of the current article is to test the
developed method on real ﬂight data. That is why after a
summary of the theory published before (to make this arti-
cle self-contained) and the additional evaluation of special
cases, it introduces our real ﬂight test system (A/C and
camera system) and applies the derived 3D collision char-
acterization on real ﬂight image data. Knowing the sizes
and real ﬂight GPS trajectories of the A/C, the obtained
camera-based results (TTCPA, CPA, and βCPA) are com-
pared to the real data. Finally, suggestions are done for
decision threshold selection and real ﬂight decision results
based on one possible combination of the thresholds are
evaluated. The structure of the paper is as follows. Section
2 brieﬂy summarizes the 3D collision characterization
from our previous article [24] by possibly partly reproduc-
ing the wording used there. Then it includes detailed eval-
uation of the possible special cases. Section 3 introduces
our test UAVs and the test scenarios. Section 4 presents
our camera system together with the image processing
issues. Section 5 summarizes the results of collision situa-
tion evaluation in real ﬂight and presents some results
about intruder detectability. Finally, Section 6 concludes
the paper.
2. Theory of 3D Collision Possibility Decision
This section includes a summary of the results obtained in
[24] estimating ﬁrst the horizontal closest point between
the A/C and the related vertical distance (P1) and second
the vertical closest point and the related horizontal distance
(P2). These points are shown in Figure 1 together with the
own aircraft body X, Y , Z coordinate system. The dashed
lines symbolize the aircraft ﬂight paths. Note that the order
of body coordinate system axes diﬀers from aerospace con-
vention to better match camera coordinate system conven-
tions of the image processing community.
Considering the interpolation between P1 and P2, the
real 3D minimum CPA can be obtained by applying the
normalized equivalent of the formula presented in [20]
equation (E4).
The underlying assumption of all of the derivations is
that the A/C ﬂy on straight paths with constant velocities.
The collision situation is evaluated relative to the X, Y , Z
body coordinate system of the own A/C. The XC , YC , ZC sep-
arate camera coordinate system will be used to characterize
camera orientation relative to the body if it is not aligned
with the body system (see, e.g., Figure 3).
The horizontal situation in the Z-X plane of the own
body coordinate system is shown in Figure 2 denoting also
P1, the horizontal closest point. To evaluate this situation
(obtain P1), one has to determine tCPA/x, CPAx/x = Xa/R,
and βCPA/x . Here, subscript x denotes that it is a horizon-
tal parameter, while the second subscript /x denotes that
the parameter is determined by looking for the horizon-
tal minimum distance. Xa is the absolute minimum hor-
izontal distance while R is the characteristic horizontal
intruder size.
In the horizontal plane, the A/C can be modeled as a disc
in the same way as in [9]. Considering that the camera of the
S&A system can be oblique relative to the body coordinate
system (see our system in Figure 10), the disc projection
model of the sense and avoid situation is shown in Figure 3.
For a detailed derivation of the disc-based camera projection
model for an oblique camera, see [22].
Finally, a system of equations (1) results which includes
the modiﬁed image parameters Sx = Sx cos β1 + cos β2 and
x = x 1 − S2x/ 16f 2 . Where x is the horizontal position
and Sx is the horizontal size of the intruder image, f is the
camera focal length, βC is the camera angle, and β1 and β2
are the view angles of the edges of the intruder image as
shown in Figure 3. All x, Sx, β1, β2 are measurable parameters
in the image and f , βC are known. The other parameters
tCPA/x , CPAx/x , and βCPA/x and the constant intruder relative
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Figure 1: Special points along the 3D A/C trajectories. The dashed
line between P1 and P2 is the straight trajectory of the intruder. Note
that βCPA/x is in the X-Z horizontal plane.
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Figure 2: Deﬁne tCPA/x (TTCPA), CPAx/x = Xa/R, and βCPA/x (intruder: red on the left, own A/C: blue on the right, and P1: the horizontal
closest position of the intruder).
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Figure 3: Oblique camera disc projection model.
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Figure 4: Vertical camera ellipse and disc projection models.
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Figure 5: Three crossing possibilities of the own horizontal plane
(red cross: intruder; blue circle: own A/C).
Figure 6: Sindy, twin-engine own aircraft.
Figure 7: Ultrastick single-engine intruder.
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Figure 8: Almost straight close (1) and far (2) trajectories.
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Figure 9: Oscillating close (1) and far (2) trajectories.
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velocities Vx, Vz are unknown (note that βCPA/x is shown in
Figure 2 and its estimation will be discussed later).
1
Sx
= CPAx/x2
sin βC
f
−
Vx sin βC + Vz cos βC
2f R tCPA/x,
x
Sx
= CPAx/x2 cos βC −
Vx cos βC − Vz sin βC
2R tCPA/x
1
In the vertical situation, the unknown parameters to
obtain P2 decrease to tCPA/y, CPAy/y as the relative angle will
be surely 90° up or down. In the vertical plane, the A/C can-
not be modeled as a disc since it is rather similar to an ellipse
(length almost equal to the horizontal size of the intruder and
height equal to the height of the intruder). However, the pin-
hole camera projection model of the ellipse is very compli-
cated and later interpolation for the 3D minimum point
requires normalization with the same size in the horizontal
and vertical CPA. Thus, an extension to the same disc size
R = 2r as in the horizontal plane is done considering also
the distortion eﬀect dependent on the α angles. This is shown
in Figure 4. For details, see [24]. Finally, the extended vertical
size in the image plane can be denoted as Sy′.
This leads to a similar system of equations as in the
horizontal case (see (1)) with modiﬁed image parameters
Sy′ = Sy′ cos α10 + cos α20 and y = y 1 − S′
2
y/ 16f 2 .
1
Sy′
= CPAx2
sin βC
f
−
Vx sin βC +Vz cos βC
2f R tCPA,
y
Sy′
=
CPAy′
2 −
Vy
2R tCPA
2
The ﬁrst equation is exactly the same as that in the
horizontal plane so the mean value of the two equations
can be considered. Summarizing the results up to now
leads to three image parameter-based equations from
which the ﬁrst two characterize the horizontal situation
(P1) while the last characterizes the vertical situation (P2):
1
2
1
Sx
+ 1
Sy′
= CPAx/x2
sin βC
f
−
Vx sin βC + Vz cos βC
2f R tCPA/x,
x
Sx
= CPAx/x2 cos βC −
Vx cos βC − Vz sin βC
2R tCPA/x,
y
Sy′
=
CPAy/y′
2 −
Vy
2R tCPA/y
3
In this system of equations, the unknowns are CPAx/x ,
CPAy/y′ , tCPA/x, and tCPA/y. The terms such as the camera angle
βC and focal length f , the relative velocities Vx, Vy ,Vz , and
the intruder size R are all constant. Considering this and
tCPA/x = tC/x − t, tCPA/y = tC/y − t, one gets another form of
the equations in (4) and (5). Note that t is the actual varying
absolute time while tC/x and tC/y are the constant absolute
times when the intruder is closest to the own A/C in the
horizontal and vertical planes, respectively.
1
2
1
Sx
+ 1
Sy′
= sin βC
f
CPAx/x
2 − a1tC/x + a1t = c1 + a1t,
x
Sx
= cos βC
CPAx/x
2 − a2tC/x + a2t = c2 + a2t,
4
Image capture:
USB3 vision camera Processing:
Tegra K1: NVIDIA
Kepler GPU + quad-
core ARM
2 GB DDR3 memory
Data recording:
128 GB SSD (SATA) Communication with control:
USB/RS232
Neutral density filter
IR cutoff filter
2 filters:
Global shutter
Resolution: 1280×960
(i)
(iv)
(i) (i)
(i)
(i)
(ii)
(ii)
(iii)
(ii)
Figure 10: Vision system mounted on Sindy UAV.
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ySy′
=
CPAy/y′
2 − a3tC/y + a3t = c3 + a3t 5
The horizontal minimum CPAx/x and the related tC/x
can be determined from (4). Fitting LS optimal linear curves
to the expressions on the left side with independent variable
t gives a1, a2, c1, c2, and this leads to a system of linear equa-
tions for CPAx/x /2 and tC/x :
sin βC
f
−a1
cos βC −a2
CPAx/x
2
tC/x
=
c1
c2
6
This system gives a solution for CPAx/x and tC/x consid-
ering the crossing of the body-ﬁxed x-axis by the intruder as
the closest point. However, as Figure 2 shows, this is not
necessarily the closest point. Perturbing the camera angle
to get βC/x′ = βC + ΔβC/x (this means −ΔβC/x virtual rotation
of the body system), one can derive the optimal value of Δ
βC/x which gives real minimum CPAx/x and the related
tC/x and βCPA/x in the horizontal plane.
sin βC + ΔβC/x
f
−a1
cos βC + ΔβC/x −a2
CPAx/x
2
tC/x
=
c1
c2
,
min
ΔβC/x
CPAx/x ⇒ tan ΔβC/x =
−a2 cos βC/f − a1 sin βC
−a2 sin βC/f + a1 cos βC
,
βCPA/x = −ΔβC/x + sign CPAx/x
π
2
7
Turning back to the vertical situation from (5), that
equation characterizes CPA in the vertical plane. In the case
where Vy = 0, a3 = 0 and CPAy/y′ ≠ 0 can be determined
simply from the time average of y/Sy′ values. For this case,
the A/C ﬂight paths are parallel in the vertical plane. In
the other case, Vy ≠ 0 and a3 ≠ 0 mean that CPAy/y′ = 0 will
be the closest vertical point as the trajectories cross each
other in the vertical plane. For this case, c3 = CPAy/y′ /2 −
a3tC/y = −a3tC/y. Doing a line ﬁt to the y/Sy′ , t data pairs
will give c3 and a3 from which tC/y can be determined:
tC/y = − c3/a3 .
It can be proven that if Vy = 0 and CPAy/y′ ≠ 0, the clos-
est horizontal point P1 will also be the closest 3D point (for
details, see [24]). Its coordinates result as follows (where v
stands for the vertical parameter and h for the horizontal
parameter):
tCMIN = tC/x,
tCPAMIN = tCMIN − t,
CPAvMIN′ = CPAy/y′ ,
CPAhMIN = CPAx/x ,
βCPAMIN = βCPA/x
8
In the other case, if Vy ≠ 0, one should determine the
vertical position of the intruder (CPAy/x′ ) in point P1 while
the horizontal position is at tC/x, CPAx/x, and βCPA/x and
also determines the horizontal position of P2 while the ver-
tical position is at tC/y and CPAy/y′ = 0.
In P1, CPAy/x′ can be determined from (5) by substituting
tC/x into c3 obtained from LS optimal line ﬁt. In P2, CPAx/y
and the related ΔβC/y (and so βCPA/y) values should be deter-
mined. This can be done considering the system of equations
for the averaged image size and horizontal data from (4) and
(7) (βC/y′ = βC + ΔβC/y).
sin βC/y′
f
−a1
cos βC/y′ −a2
 
CPAx/y
2
tC/y
=
c1
c2
9
As tC/y is known, the system can be reformulated having
the known values on the right-hand side:
sin βC + ΔβC/y
CPAx/y
2f = a1tC/y + c1 = b1,
cos βC + ΔβC/y
CPAx/y
2 = a2tC/y + c2 = b2,
10
where the unknowns are CPAx/y and ΔβC/y. Depending on
the values of b1 and b2, there can be diﬀerent solutions. For
details, see [24].
Summarizing the developments, one has two points,
P1 with parameters CPAx/x, βCPA/x , CPAy/x′ , tC/x and P2 with
CPAx/y , βCPA/y, CPAy/y , tC/y as shown in Figure 1.
The coordinates of points P1 and P2 in the body coordi-
nate system (X, Y , Z in Figure 1) so result as follows:
P1
Z1 = cos βCPA/xCPAx/x,
X1 = sin βCPA/xCPAx/x,
Y1 = CPAy/x′ ,
11
P2
Z2 = cos βCPA/yCPAx/y,
X2 = sin βCPA/yCPAx/y,
Y2 = 0
12
An interpolated point between P1 and P2 can be repre-
sented as follows. Note that the given representation with
5International Journal of Aerospace Engineering
the tM parameter makes extrapolation before P1 or after
P2 also possible.
ZM = Z1 + tM
Z2 − Z1
tC/y − tC/x
= Z1 + tMΔZ,
XM = X1 + tM
X2 − X1
tC/y − tC/x
= X1 + tMΔX,
YM = Y1 + tM
Y2 − Y1
tC/y − tC/x
= Y1 + tMΔY
13
Minimizing the 3D distance D = Z2M + X2M + Y2M gives
tM = − Z1ΔZ + X1ΔX + Y1ΔY/ΔZ2 + ΔX2 + ΔY2 which
is exactly the same as the tCPA value calculated in [20] (E4)
from absolute trajectory parameters, but here, this is an
extension of the formula relative to CPA distances. Consider-
ing this result, the time of minimum 3D distance and the
related relative CPA values in case the A/C trajectories cross
the vertical plane can be determined as follows:
tCMIN = tC/x + tM ,
tCPAMIN = tCMIN − t,
CPAvMIN′ = YM ,
CPAhMIN = X2M + Z2M ,
tan βCPAMIN =
XM
ZM
14
Finally, CPAvMIN related to the H real vertical size
(Sy real vertical image size) of the intruder should be calcu-
lated from CPAvMIN′ (calculated from the extended Sy′ vertical
image size) considering the ratio k between horizontal and
vertical sizes and taking its time average k:
k = H
R
≈
Sy
Sx
,
CPAvMIN =
Ya
H
= 1
k
CPAvMIN′
15
The approximation in (15) shows that there can be diﬀer-
ent distortions of Sy and Sx. A method to correct this is pro-
posed in [24] and so k should be calculated based on the
corrected values.
2.1. Possible Special Cases. After developing the formulae,
they should be examined for special cases to avoid any singu-
larity in the calculations. Sources such as [25, 26] point out
that a critical special case in A/C collision avoidance is the
case of collision with zero miss distance where the intruder
A/C will be steady in the pilot’s view. For this case, it will
be also steady in the camera system’s view and so this can
be a problematic case in image-based S&A also. Considering
an oblique camera setup, three special cases can occur in the
horizontal plane:
Case 1. Xa = 0, Vx = 0, and βC ≠ 0 which means a head-on
scenario with zero miss distance and an oblique observer
camera.
Case 2. Xa = 0, Vx ≠ 0, and βC = 0 which means a crossing
scenario with zero miss distance and a forward-looking
camera.
Case 3. Xa = 0, Vx = 0, and βC = 0 which means a head-on
scenario with zero miss distance and a forward-looking
camera.
These cases are examined in the sequel considering also
the possible vertical situation and that CPAx/x = 0 in all cases
because Xa = 0.
2.1.1. Case 1 (Vx = 0, βC ≠ 0). In this case, the horizontal
equations from (3) and (4) degrade to
1
2
1
Sx
+ 1
Sy′
= −Vz cos βC2f R tCPA/x = −a1tC/x + a1t = c1 + a1t,
x
Sx
= Vz sin βC2R tCPA/x = −a2tC/x + a2t = c2 + a2t
16
This shows that the LS optimal line ﬁts can be done
ﬂawlessly and so a1, a2, c1, c2 are obtained with a1 =Vz cos
βC/ 2f R and a2 =Vz sin βC/ 2R theoretical values.
Substituting these into the expression of ΔβC/x in (7) gives
tan ΔβC/x =
Vz sin βC cos βC/ 2f R − Vz sin βC cos βC/ 2f R
Vz sin2βC/2f R/ 2f R + Vz cos2βC/ 2f R
= 0
17
This gives ΔβC/x = 0 and the following form of the equa-
tion system to be solved from (7) (considering also c1 = −a1
tC/x and c2 = −a2tC/x theoretical values):
sin βC
f
−a1
cos βC −a2
U =
−a1tC/x
−a2tC/x
18
It is easy to derive the solution as
U =
0
tC/x
, 19
which givesCPAx/x = 0 and tC/x. Considering βCPA/x from (7),
one gets βCPA/x = 0 as −ΔβC/x = 0 and sign CPAx/x = 0 = 0.
Considering now the possible vertical situations if Vy = 0,
it is either CPAy/y′ = const ≠ 0 or CPAy/y′ = 0 if the A/C ﬂy in
the same horizontal plane y = 0→ y = 0 . The calculation
of both of them is straightforward from the mean value of
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y/Sy′ and will be the same in the further two cases also. The
only vertical scenario left is the crossing of the own horizon-
tal plane by the intruder with CPAy/y′ = 0 and Vy ≠ 0. For
this case, after determining tC/y, CPAx/y should be deter-
mined from (10) considering that b1 = a1 tC/y − tC/x , b2 =
a2 tC/y − tC/x . The relation of tC/y and tC/x gives three possi-
ble cases shown in Figure 5.
The vertical crossing can be earlier than the horizontal
one (in front of the own A/C) (tC/y < tC/x; no. 1 in Figure 5),
and it can be at the same time (tC/y = tC/x ; no. 2 in Figure 5)
or later (behind the own A/C) (tC/y > tC/x; no. 3 in Figure 5).
In the second case, b1 = 0, b2 = 0, and CPAx/y = 0 according
to [24]. In the other cases, b1 ≠ 0 and so the formula from
[24] can be used to determine ΔβC/y
tan ΔβC/y =
cos βC − b2/ b1 f sin βC
sin βC + b2/ b1 f cos βC
20
Substituting the theoretical values of a1, a2 into b1, b2 and
the latter into (20) equation gives
tan ΔβC/y =
cos βC + tan βC sin βC
sin βC − tan βC cos βC
=∞ 21
This gives ΔβC/y = π/2 and CPAx/y can be calculated
from this. Finally, βCPA/y = −π/2 + sign CPAx/y π/2 which
is either 0 or −π radian giving the expected in-front or
behind crossing.
Finally, the calculation of the 3D minimum distance with
interpolation should be examined for the special case. The
ﬁnal parameters are βCPA/x = 0, CPAx/x = 0, CPAy/x′ ≠ 0,
βCPA/y = 0 or −π, and CPAx/y ≠ 0 (CPAy/x′ can be determined
from (5) knowing c3 and tC/x). This gives the coordinates of
points P1 and P2 as Z1 = 0, X1 = 0, Y1 = CPAy/x′ and Z2 = ±
CPAx/y, X2 = 0, Y2 = 0 from (11) and (12), respectively. Con-
sidering the interpolation, the only singular case is tC/y = tC/x
where the horizontal and vertical crossing coincides and this
gives immediately the 3D minimum. Otherwise, there is no
problem in calculating the minimizing tM parameter with Δ
Z ≠ 0, ΔX = 0, and ΔY ≠ 0.
2.1.2. Case 2 (Vx ≠ 0, βC = 0). In this case, the LS optimal
line ﬁts can also be done ﬂawlessly and so a1, a2, c1, c2
are obtained with a1 = Vz/ 2f R and a2 = Vx/ 2R theoret-
ical values. Substituting these into the expression of ΔβC/x
in (7) gives
tan ΔβC/x =
− Vx/ 2f R
Vz/ 2f R
= −Vx
Vz
≠ 0 22
This is the calculation formula that resulted from a
forward-looking camera in [23] so it is natural to get
this result. Now, the equation system to be solved from
(7) results as (considering also βC = 0, c1 = −a1tC/x, c2 = −a2
tC/x)
sin ΔβC/x
f
−a1
cos ΔβC/x −a2
U =
−a1tC/x
−a2tC/x
, 23
giving again
U =
0
tC/x
, 24
which gives CPAx/x = 0 and tC/x . Considering βCPA/x from
(7), one gets βCPA/x = −ΔβC/x = 0 as sign CPAx/x = 0 = 0.
This is only a theoretical value because CPAx/x = 0 and has
no deﬁnite direction.
Considering the only special vertical case with CPAy/y′ = 0
andVy ≠ 0, no. 1 and no. 3 cases with b1 ≠ 0 give the following:
tan ΔβC/y =
Vz
Vx
25
From this, ΔβC/y = −π/2 − β∞v and ΔβCPA/y = π/2 + β∞v +
sign CPAx/y π/2. β∞v = const is the view angle of the intruder
from the own aircraft if Xa = 0 and can be obtained from
tan β∞v = −Vx/−Vz (for details, see [23]). So ﬁnally, the cross-
ing of horizontal plane will be along the line characterized by
β∞v in this direction or in the opposite direction.
Regarding the calculation of the 3D minimum distance
with interpolation, the ﬁnal parameters here result as
βCPA/x ≠ 0, CPAx/x = 0, CPAy/x′ ≠ 0, βCPA/y = β∞v or β∞v + π,
and CPAx/y ≠ 0. This gives the coordinates of points P1 and
P2 as Z1 = 0, X1 = 0, Y1 = CPAy/x′ and Z2 ≠ 0, X2 ≠ 0, Y2 = 0
from (11) and (12), respectively. Considering the interpola-
tion, the only singular case is tC/y = tC/x where the horizontal
and vertical crossing coincides and this gives immediately
the 3D minimum. Otherwise, there is no problem in calcu-
lating the minimizing tM parameter with ΔZ ≠ 0, ΔX ≠ 0,
and ΔY ≠ 0.
2.1.3. Case 3 (Vx = 0, βC = 0). In this case, (16) further sim-
pliﬁes and the LS optimal line ﬁts will give a1, c1, a2 = 0,
c2 = 0 by ﬁtting the second line on a constant zero parameter.
This leads to
tan ΔβC/x =
0
a1
= 0, 26
which gives ΔβC/x = 0 and so βCPA/x = 0. The ﬁrst equation in
(7) simpliﬁes to
0 −a1
1 0
U =
−a1tC/x
0
, 27
giving again
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U =
0
tC/x
, 28
which gives CPAx/x = 0 and tC/x . Considering the only special
vertical case with CPAy/y′ = 0 and Vy ≠ 0, no. 1 and no. 3 cases
with b1 ≠ 0, b2 = 0 give the following:
tanΔβC/y =
1
0 =∞ 29
This gives ΔβC/y = π/2 as in Case 1 and βCPA/y = −π/2 +
sign CPAx/y π/2 which is either 0 or −π radian giving in-
front (of the own A/C) or behind crossing.
Regarding the calculation of the 3D minimum distance
with interpolation, the ﬁnal parameters here have the same
result as in Case 1, βCPA/x = 0, CPAx/x = 0, CPAy/x′ ≠ 0,
βCPA/y = 0 or π, and CPAx/y ≠ 0. From this point, the same
deduction can be done.
2.1.4. Summary about Special Cases. All of these derivations
show that original formulae (4), (5), (7), (10), and (13) can
be well applied in these special cases without any modiﬁca-
tion. This is underlined by the Monte-Carlo test run in [24]
where Case 2 and Case 3 scenarios are included both with
special tC/y = tC/x and crossing in-front and behind vertical
setups and there were no singularity or any problem with
the formulae. Of course, for real data, the theoretical values
will be corrupted by noise but considering multiple measure-
ments will smoothen this out in some extent.
After developing a method to determine the 3D mini-
mum distance (relative to intruder size) between two A/C
in an encounter scenario, it should be tested in detail. Refer-
ence [24] presented promising results of a SIL Monte-Carlo
simulation campaign. The current article presents results
based on real ﬂight data. This will be done in Section 5 after
introducing the test A/C and scenarios and the used camera
system and image processing methods.
3. Test Aircraft and Scenarios
Real ﬂight tests are conducted with two UAVs on an airﬁeld
near Budapest (Hungary). The own A/C is a large 3.5m
wingspan, about 10-12 kg twin-engine A/C called Sindy
(see Figure 6) developed in our institute (SZTAKI) to carry
large payloads such as the sense and avoid system (for details
and building instructions (as it is an open source project),
see [27]).
The intruder A/C is a small 1.27m wingspan 1.5-2 kg
single-engine A/C which is the E-ﬂite Ultra Stick 25e (see
Figure 7). The small size of the intruder makes detection
and decision about the collision diﬃcult as the numerical
results will show. However, as the S&A system works accept-
ably in this scenario which is close to the worst case, the sys-
tem will perform even better as the conditions get better.
Both A/C are equipped with IMU +GPS + Pitot tube and
an air pressure sensor and an MPC5200 onboard microcon-
troller with attitude estimation and autopilot algorithms.
Waypoint or trajectory tracking (constructed from straight
lines and arcs) is also possible with them. For the details of
the sense and avoid hardware/software system on Sindy, see
Section 4.
The S&A test ﬂights were conducted in October/-
November 2016 by ﬂying the two A/C on parallel, horizontal,
straight ﬂight paths with 15m (close ﬂight) and 30m (far
ﬂight) horizontal side distances between them. The ﬂying
on nonparallel paths would be much more complicated as
[28] points out. The own A/C air relative velocity was set to
be 20m/s while that of the intruder was 17m/s giving
37m/s closing speed in the ideal case. During the ﬁrst set of
test ﬂights, the avoidance was deactivated to make in detail
oﬄine algorithm evaluation possible. Note that if an avoid-
ance maneuver is done, the own A/C trajectory is modiﬁed
and it is impossible to evaluate the closest point as if there
was no avoidance. In the second set of test ﬂights, avoidance
in the horizontal plane (only considering P1 parameters) was
activated and maximum bank turn avoidance maneuvers
were done when required. Setup of a safety altitude separa-
tion (15m for close test and 10m for far test) was mandatory
in the ﬁrst set and advised in the second (that is why only
horizontal avoidance was applied). Depending on the initial
conditions, actual wind disturbance, and turbulence, the
tracking of the straight line can show some oscillatory behav-
iour which can compromise camera data and the precision of
the S&A algorithm. A close test case and a far test case with
almost straight trajectories are shown in Figure 8 while oscil-
lating ones are shown in Figure 9.
4. Camera System
Figure 10 presents the camera system hardware and the main
characteristics of the components. The system includes two
Basler dcA 1280 cameras which have a 65.4° ﬁeld of view
(FOV). They are setup with βC = ±30° camera angles which
gives ﬁnally ±62.7° total FOV. This is in good agreement with
the ±60° angle range suggested for pilots to scan for intruders
in [25]. The NVIDIA Jetson TK1 board is responsible for
image processing and decision making. This hardware is
capable of processing and saving the 2x HD monochrome
video input at about 8 fps. Communication between the auto-
pilot and camera system is minimal. The autopilot sends the
orientation of the aircraft while the camera system sends only
an evasion alert and suggested avoidance direction.
4.1. Image Processing. Recent papers on ﬂying object detec-
tion and tracking utilize deep neural networks [29]. The
accuracy of these methods is impressive; however, these tech-
niques have too large computational complexity for onboard
real-time computation. The evolution of new hardware and
research on more eﬃcient neural network design will lead
to robust ﬂying object detection in the future; however,
now, diﬀerent methods were applied. Here, we introduce
our approach which was used in the real ﬂight tests. The task
of detecting ﬂying objects in images is easier being against the
sky than against the ground. All objects which are not a cloud
or the sun and have no connection to the ground are ﬂying
objects and can be determined on a single frame. Against
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the ground, we could detect and track objects which are
moving compared to the background considering multiple
frames for the detection. Our method now focused on detec-
tion against sky background with the following three stages:
sky-ground separation, blob detection against sky back-
ground, and false object ﬁltering.
4.1.1. Sky-Ground Separation.We perform sky-ground sepa-
ration by horizon detection. The basic method was published
in [30]. The main idea is to calculate a horizon line based on
the orientation of the aircraft and the known relative orienta-
tion of the camera. This horizon line is not accurate enough,
because of the small airframe deformations during maneu-
vers and calibration errors, but this makes it very easy to cre-
ate a good sky-ground separation (Figure 11).
4.1.2. Blob Detection against Sky Background. Algorithm 1
is an example preprocessing method to extract candidate
objects. Candidate objects include real ﬂying objects with
false positives (cloud edges and so forth). A successfully
detected aircraft and its enlarged and shaded region can
be seen in Figure 12. Thus, an object ﬁlter is applied to
classify ﬂying objects.
4.1.3. Object Filter. Most of the false sky objects can be elim-
inated eﬃciently with simple ﬁltering rules. The main rule
deﬁnes threshold on the pixel variance in the neighborhood
of the object mask which eliminates cloud edges. These hand-
crafted rules were enough for successful ﬂight tests in good
conditions (homogeneous clear or cloudy background);
however, in some cases, we had still too many false positive
objects which can cause false evasions. With the next-
generation faster NVIDIA TX1-based camera system, classi-
ﬁcation of candidate objects could be performed with a small
convolutional neural network.
4.1.4. Parameters to the Collision Decision. Finally, the hori-
zontal and vertical centroid positions (x, y) and object sizes
(Sx, Sy) are obtained after detection. From these parameters,
a rectangle is created which is egomotion compensated (see
[10]). This means rotation from the camera to the body, from
the body to the trajectory, and then from the trajectory to the
camera coordinate system. The trajectory system is a body
system rotated to be parallel to the straight ﬂight trajectory.
This way, the intruder direction is evaluated relative to the
trajectory direction irrespective of the current orientation of
the own aircraft. After egomotion compensation, (x, y) and
(Sx, Sy) are recalculated and then passed to the algorithm in
Section 2.
5. Real Flight Test Results
From the ﬁrst set of ﬂight tests (without avoidance), several
important parameters can be evaluated such as the detection
distance dD of the intruder, the time frame Ft to make a deci-
sion and execute avoidance (from time of detection to time of
CPA), and the fps (frames per second) rate of the camera
system. 8 close and 9 far encounters were ﬂown, and data
synchronization between the two A/C was done considering
the global GPS UTC (coordinated universal time) time
stamps. Note that the GPS frequency is 5Hz so the time res-
olution of data is 0.2 s. The minimum, maximum, and
mean values and the standard deviations (STD) of the
above parameters are summarized in Table 1 for the close
and far encounters.
Figure 11: Horizon detection in the image with radial distortion. The blue line represents the horizon calculated from orientation, and the red
line corresponds to the improved sky-ground separation.
1. Step: 5 × 5 erosion (grayscale)
2. Step: 13 × 13 Gaussian ﬁlter
3. Step: adaptive threshold: pixel threshold = 9 × 9 average − 2
4. Step: 5 × 5 erosion (binary)
5. Step: 5 × 5 dilation (binary).
Algorithm 1. Preprocessing.
Figure 12: Aircraft detection. The red region in the enlarged image
shows the object mask from preprocessing.
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Considering the data in the table, the fps of the camera
system with onboard image processing and decision making
is between 6.3 and 8Hz with a mean of about 7.5Hz. This is
about half or less than the 15-20Hz in [12], but in that paper,
they did ground-based calculations with a laptop computer
while we applied an onboard system carriable by the Sindy
A/C and making the S&A system autonomous. Future hard-
ware developments can easily increase this rate.
The detection distance is between 122 and 204m in the
close scenarios while it is between 55 and 244m in the far
ones. Here, detection means that the tracking of the intruder
by the camera system is stable and continuous from that
point. The mean values are 172 and 164m, respectively.
Regarding the means, these results outperform the 60-70m
detection distance of a 1.6m wingspan A/C in [12] (note that
our intruder wingspan is only 1.27m). The very small (55m)
detection distance in the far scenarios is an outlier (the mean
164m is close to the close scenario 172m mean), and we
could not ﬁgure out what caused it. The ﬂight trajectories
were good, and so, the intruder could not move out of the
camera system FOV so possibly some image blur or distor-
tion could cause it.
The time frame to make a decision is 3.47-5.59 s for close
and 1.77 6.35 s for far scenarios because of the same reasons
as for dD. The means are 4.7 s and 4.5 s, respectively, which
do not provide too much time to make a decision and execute
avoidance. Considering the later selected 3 s TTCPA thresh-
old which provides 2 to 4 s real time until the closest point
and the required 2-3 s convergence time of our algorithm, it
would be better to have 6-7 s from observation until the clos-
est point. That is why such a small A/C as an Ultrastick air-
craft is a critical case which makes avoidance with large
safety distance impossible. On the contrary, our article [31]
points out that for general aviation A/C (7m and above
wingspan), the time from detection to the closest point is at
least 7 seconds which can provide enough time for successful
avoidance. It is also worth noting that approximately 10 s
[25] and 12.5 s [26] are the required time for a human pilot
to detect, identify, and avoid an intruder which is outper-
formed by the 6-7 s time of our system. From dD and Ft ,
the average closing speed of the A/C can be calculated which
results between 31 and 40m/s with a mean of about 36.5m/s
close to the theoretical 37m/s value.
5.1. More Details about Intruder Detectability. An exhaustive
study about the detectability of intruders with diﬀerent
camera systems, sizes, and speed is published in [31]. Some
of the observations deduced there are repeated here to put
our previous observations into context. At ﬁrst, it is worth
to mention that the detectability of an object by a camera
mainly depends on the sensor area occupied by the image
on the sensor. This area can be directly related to the object
pixels through the so-called pixel pitch parameter. Another
possibility can be to use the subtended angle of the object,
but this suﬀers from distortion by approaching the edges of
the image plane. So ﬁnally, the covered area (size) was con-
sidered in [31]. Table 2 repeats the considered camera
parameters from there.
Our camera in the ﬂight tests is the Basler dcA 1280.
Considering the R = 1 27m size of the Ultrastick aircraft
and the Z = 164m average detection distance makes it
possible to calculate the average detectable size in pixels
as S = f ⋅ R/Z ≈ 8 px. Considering the pixel pitch, this
gives about 30μm size on the sensor. The MIN sizes for
the other cameras in the table were calculated from this
value. The minimum and maximum detection distances
for several aircraft sizes were calculated considering the
worst (dcA 1280) and best (acA 2040) cameras as shown
in Table 3.
For the Ultrastick A/C, the worst distance (159m) is close
to our mean detection distance (164m) which is not surpris-
ing as we calculated the parameters from this. Our maximum
detection distance (244m) is very close to the best result
(245m) which means that even the worst camera can give
superior results in some cases but, of course, using higher-
resolution cameras can improve the results. These tests in
[31] and the pinhole projection formula Z = f ⋅ R/S show that
the camera should have a large focal length (f ) and small
detectable occupied sensor area S. That is why acA 2040 out-
performed acA 2500 because S is much larger and the focal
length is almost the same in the latter case.
The time to the closest point of approach at the time of
A/C detection strongly depends on the speed of the own
and intruder A/C. A thorough evaluation of this problem is
done in [31].
5.2. Results and Thresholding with Flight Test Data. The ﬁrst
set of ﬂights (without avoidance) makes it possible to com-
pare S&A system estimates with real physical data. Real 2D
(only horizontal) and 3D closest points were calculated from
GPS data for all close and far encounters. Then the calcu-
lated distances were normalized by intruder wingspan b =
R = 1 27m and height H = 0 33m (the real height/size ratio
thus results as k = 0 33/1 27 = 0 26) to ﬁnally get tCPAMIN,
CPAvMIN′ , CPAhMIN, βCPAMIN. As the A/C ﬂy on horizontal
paths, there is no crossing in the vertical plane and so the
vertical CPAvMIN′ ≠ 0 and the 2D horizontal CPA is the same
as the that of the 3D. So, it is enough to compare the esti-
mated and real 3D results.
The S&A algorithm was run oﬄine for all close and far
encounters, and the estimates are compared to the A/C
trajectory-based real values in Figures 13–19. The LS line ﬁts
were done on 7 data points to consider about 1 s data (fps is
about 7.5).
Table 1: Basic essential parameters of S&A system application.
Parameter (unit) MIN MAX Mean STD
Close
dD (m) 122.2 204.5 171.9 26.6
Ft (s) 3.47 5.59 4.68 0.77
fps (Hz) 7 8 7.52 0.37
Far
dD (m) 54.7 244.4 163.7 53.3
Ft (s) 1.77 6.35 4.48 1.36
fps (Hz) 6.34 8 7.41 0.56
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Figure 13 shows the estimated tCPAMIN on the horizontal
axis and the error real tCPAMIN − estimated tCPAMIN on the
vertical axis. Note that tCPAMIN changes with t in every time
step as the intruder approaches the own A/C. These
tCPAMIN time series values are plotted together with their
instantaneous errors in the ﬁgure. If the error is positive,
there is more time to CPA than estimated. This representa-
tion is advantageous to consider the possibilities for decision
threshold (THS) selection. The ﬁgure shows that ﬁrst (when
the estimated tCPAMIN is large), the TTCPA is overestimated
and then, as the intruder approaches, it is underestimated.
Table 4 summarizes the observations.
According to the table, an estimated tCPAMIN THS of 3 s
will result in a decision between 2 and 4 s real time before
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Figure 13: Estimation errors of 3D TTCPA (red x: close encounters;
blue circle: far encounters).
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Figure 14: Estimation errors of 3D horizontal CPA (red x: close
encounters; blue circle: far encounters).
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Figure 15: TTCPA-horizontal CPA nomogram (red x: close
encounters; blue circle: far encounters).
Table 2: Camera data.
Type Basler dcA 1280 Basler acA 1440 Basler acA 2040 Basler acA 2500
Pixel count (Mp) 1.2 1.6 3 5
Camera resolution 1280 × 960 1440 × 1080 2048 × 1536 2592 × 1944
Pixel pitch (μm) 3.75 3.45 3.45 2.2
Focal length f (px) 997.3 1217.4 1739.1 1818.2
View angle (°) 65.4 61.2 61 71
MIN size S (px) 8 9 9 14
Table 3: Camera system detectability results.
AC type Size (m) Worst range (m) Best range (m)
Boeing 747 68 8477 13140
Boeing C-17 52 6482 10048
Embraer ERJ-145 25 3117 4830
MQ-9 Reaper 15.6 1945 3014
MQ-8 Fire Scout 7.7 960 1488
Ultrastick 1.27 159 245
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Figure 16: TTCPA-vertical CPA (R relative) nomogram (red x:
vertical far encounters; blue circle: vertical close encounters).
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CPA. Selecting a larger THS will not increase the possible
smallest real value (2 s) while smaller THS will decrease it,
so 3 s is the ideal selection.
Figure 14 shows the estimated CPAhMIN on the horizon-
tal axis and the error real CPAhMIN − estimated CPAhMIN on
the vertical axis. Here, the real CPAhMIN is a constant given
value in every encounter but it changes encounter by encoun-
ter depending on the shape of the ﬂight trajectories. At the
same time, the estimated one changes every time step as
new and new images are considered in the estimation
method. If the error is positive, the intruder is farther than
estimated. It is interesting to see that for close encounters,
CPAhMIN is usually underestimated, while for far encoun-
ters, it is usually overestimated. Table 5 summarizes the
observations. According to the table, the avoidance of an
intruder with a horizontal CPA of 4 or below can be guar-
anteed by any THS and only intruders above 25-28 CPA
can be surely considered as nonthreatening. Avoidance of
any intruder at or below 4 CPA will not give well clear but
can provide the last chance to solve the situation without
collision.
In case of CPA THS selection, the relation of CPA
estimates with the TTCPA estimates is vital to evaluate
decidability (between collision and noncollision). This is
because collision decision is done examining the absolute
CPA estimate when estimated TTCPA is below the selected
THS. That is why TTCPA-CPA nomograms should be plot-
ted and applied for THS selection. Figure 15 shows the esti-
mated tCPAMIN on the horizontal axis (plotted only below
3.5 s as its THS is 3 s) and CPAhMIN on the vertical axis
together with two possible horizontal CPA THS values.
The ﬁrst (magenta dashed line) is 20 while the second
(green continuous line) is 26. The ﬁrst (20) has more close
scenario crosses above it and so can result in missed detec-
tion with higher probability. Below 2.25 s estimated TTCPA,
all the red crosses are below the second (26) so this should
guarantee detection of close threat at least below this time.
Of course, the larger THS will result in more false alarms
as several far scenario circles are below it.
Table 6 shows estimation error evaluation results for ver-
tical CPA (CPAvMIN′ ) similarly to Table 5 based on a ﬁgure
similar to Figure 14 but not presented here. In this case,
intruders below 4-5 vertical CPA (relative to intruder
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Figure 17: Estimation errors of the direction of CPA (red x: close
encounters; blue circle: far encounters).
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Figure 18: Estimation errors of size ratio (red x: close encounters;
blue circle: far encounters).
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Figure 19: TTCPA-vertical CPA (H relative) nomogram (red x:
vertical far encounters; blue circle: vertical close encounters).
Table 4: tCPAMIN estimation results.
Estimated tCPAMIN (s) 4 3 2 1
Error (s) -2/+1 -1/+1 -0.5/+2.7 -0.5/+1
Real tCPAMIN (s) 2/5 2/4 1.5/4.7 1.5/2
Table 5: CPAhMIN estimation results.
Estimated CPAhMIN (-) 26 20 15 10
Error (-) -22/+5 -16/+7 -11/+10 -4.2/+15
Real CPAhMIN (-) 4/28 4/27 4/25 5.8/25
Table 6: Vertical CPA estimation results.
Estimated CPAv (-) 25 20 15 10
Error (-) -20/-15 -16/-10 -10/-4 -5/+1
Real CPAv (-) 5/10 4/10 5/11 5/11
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horizontal size) can be guaranteed to be avoided and those
above 10-11 CPA can be considered as nonthreatening.
Figure 16 shows the estimated tCPAMIN on the horizontal
axis and CPAvMIN′ on the vertical axis together with two pos-
sible vertical CPA THS values. The ﬁrst (magenta dashed
line) is 5 while the second (green continuous line) is 20.
The ﬁrst has several circles (which is the vertical close sce-
nario with 10m altitude separation) above it and so can result
in missed detections. The second has only a few circles above
it, but all the crosses are below if tCPAMIN < 1 25 s. This means
that on one side, it possibly will not do missed detection but
on the other side, it will generate false alarms for all far verti-
cal encounters.
Figure 17 shows the real tCPAMIN on the horizontal axis
and the error estimatedβCPAMIN − realβCPAMIN on the verti-
cal axis. The ﬁgure shows that the direction estimation is very
uncertain so it is not advisable to use it for precise avoidance.
This large uncertainty is caused by the oscillating ﬂight paths
despite the egomotion compensation of image data. Note
that egomotion compensation removes only the rotational
component of the oscillation; the position change distur-
bances are not removed. Detailed examination of the esti-
mates shows that their sign is correct and so at least the
side of the intruder can be decided based on them.
Figure 18 shows the real tCPAMIN on the horizontal axis
and the size ratio error estimated k − 0 26 /0 26 · 100% on
the vertical axis. Here, 0.26 is the real size ratio. The ﬁgure
shows that k is overestimated most of the time.
Figure 19 shows the tCPAMIN − CPAvMIN nomogram with
thresholds from Figure 16 transformed by dividing by 0.26
which is the real size ratio. The ﬁgure shows that here again,
thresholds which cause missed detections or false alarms can
only be selected as the vertically close and far cases are over-
lapping even for small estimated TTCPA.
Finally, a decision test campaign was run oﬄine on the
real ﬂight data applying ﬁve THS pairs shown in Table 7.
The decision is done if the estimated tCPAMIN is below its
threshold. Collision is decided if the estimated CPA is below
the given THS (this makes possible a more precise decision
than in [12] where every intruder is avoided which is in the
image for a longer time). Results are summarized in Table 8
for the close encounters and Table 9 for the far encounters
referencing the THS case numbers from the ﬁrst row of
Table 7. In the close encounters the horizontal decision
should be collision and the vertical non-collision (NC). In
the far encounters horizontal non-collision and vertical colli-
sion decisions are expected. In Tables 8 and 9, the numbers
mean the real TTCPA time in seconds at the time of collision
decision if collision is decided. In case of NC decision, an NC
symbol is used.
Table 8 shows that no. 1 to no.3 THS pairs well detect the
possibility of collision in the horizontal plane. The only dif-
ference is at the time of detection.
The earliest detection is achieved by the tCPAMIN < 3 s and
CPAhMIN < 26 pair (no. 1) while the latest by the tCPAMIN
< 2 s and CPAhMIN < 20 (no. 3). The real TTCPA values
are between 2 and 4 s in most of the cases as predicted in
Table 4. The only outlier is the ﬁrst ﬂight where the
estimated TTCPA crosses the THS late after a sudden
decrease. In the vertical (nos. 4 and 5) plane, NCs are
expected while 50% false alarm is achieved by no. 4 and
100% by no. 5. In view of the 8− 10 range of real CPAv′
values based on GPS data, this is not surprising as only in
above 10-11 is a guarantee of NC decision present both with
5 and with 20 THS (see Table 6).
Table 9 shows that no. 1 to no. 3 THS pairs generate a lot
of false alarms as follows: 8/9 (89%), 6/9 (67%), and 4/9
(44%). Given the 18−30 range with mean 25 of real CPAh
values based on GPS data, this is not surprising as only in
above 25-28 is a guarantee of NC decision present both with
20 and with 26 THS (see Table 5). In the vertical plane, there
is no missed detection; the only diﬀerence between tCPAMIN
< 3 s, CPAvMIN < 5 (no. 4) and tCPAMIN < 3 s, CPAvMIN < 20
(no. 5) is the time of decision. The latter decides earlier on
which can be advantageous to execute avoidance.
Summarizing the results, the no. 2 THS pair (tCPAMIN < 3 s
and CPAhMIN < 20) can be useful in the horizontal plane as
it provides more time for avoidance than the no. 3 pair
though it gives very high false alarm rate. In the vertical
plane, the no. 5 pair (tCPAMIN < 3 s and CPAhMIN < 20) is
better as it provides more time for avoidance despite the
100% false alarm rate. Note that the false alarm rates should
get lower as the horizontal or vertical distance is increased
between the A/C.
Table 7: Selected threshold combinations.
Number 1 2 3 4 5
tCPAMIN (s) 3 3 2 3 3
Estimated CPAh (-) 26 20 20 — —
Estimated CPAv′ (-) — — — 5 20
Table 8: Decision results in the close encounters.
Flight case 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
No. 1 H 1.56 4.15 3.1 4.65 2.7 3 4.2 2.5
No. 2 H 1.43 3.14 2.97 4.65 2.7 3 4.2 2.5
No. 3 H 1.43 3.14 2.97 4.52 2.33 1.8 4.2 2.5
No. 4 V 1.31 2.73 2.3 NC NC NC 4.2 NC
No. 5 V 1.94 4.15 3.1 4.52 2.7 3 4.2 2.5
H denotes horizontal decisions, while V denotes vertical decisions.
Table 9: Decision results in the far encounters.
Flight case 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
No. 1 H 4.02 1 NC 3.7 3.13 3.3 1.3 3.7 1.8
No. 2 H 4.02 NC NC 3.7 3.13 3.3 NC 3.7 1.8
No. 3 H NC NC NC 1.58 NC 2.8 NC 1.8 1.5
No. 4 V 2.87 1 2.29 1.96 1.58 3.3 2.2 1.8 1
No. 5 V 4.02 1 2.42 3.7 2.73 3.9 2.2 3.7 1.8
H denotes horizontal decisions, while V denotes vertical decisions.
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A second set of ﬂight tests was done in 2016 (on a diﬀer-
ent day) by applying the tCPAMIN < 2 s and CPAhMIN < 20 (no.
3) THS pair only in the horizontal plane and activating the
S&A avoidance. In the close scenarios, a 0/8 (0%) missed
detection rate was observed while in the far ones, the false
alarm rate was 4/8 (50%). All these rates are close to the ones
estimated from the tables. Checking the A/C trajectories with
the avoidance has shown that the collision decision was made
sometimes too late to signiﬁcantly increase the distance
between A/C. This could be predicted from the detection
time results in Table 8. Possibly, the 3 s TTCPA THS can
improve these results; this requires a future test campaign.
Ground and aerial (onboard) videos of the second set of ﬂight
tests in 2016 can be found in the supplementary material and
on our Youtube channel called AeroGNC.
6. Conclusions
This paper presented the real ﬂight validation of 3D collision
decision based on monocular images in aircraft sense and
avoid. After the review of literature and author’s previous
works, the theoretical basics were brieﬂy summarized target-
ing the estimation of 3D time to the closest point of approach
and closest point of approach. The feasibility of possible spe-
cial cases with the derived formulae is examined, and there is
no need to handle any of them separately—the original
formulae can handle everything well. Then the test UAVs
and ﬂight test scenarios were introduced together with the
onboard camera and computing system. A short analysis of
intruder aircraft detectability with diﬀerent camera systems
is provided referencing the author’s separate exhaustive work
about this topic. Real test ﬂights with close and far encounters
without avoidance were conducted, and the estimated colli-
sion parameters were compared to the aircraft trajectory-
based real ones. A strategy to select the decision thresholds
was proposed, and then the oﬄine decision results were pre-
sented and evaluated and ﬁnally compared to real ﬂight test
results (with avoidance) with a given threshold pair. The ﬁnal
conclusion is that the proposed system is capable of detecting
and attempting to avoid close intruder aircraft even if it is as
small as 1.27m (wingspan) but of course larger size intruders
are easier to be detected and avoided. Intruders with 7m
wingspan and above are predicted to be avoided with enough
safety distance, but this also depends on own aircraft maneu-
vering capabilities and intruder speed. By applying other
camera systems, this can be further improved.
Future research should focus on two diﬀerent topics.
First, a relation between software-in-the-loop simulation
results in previous works of the authors [23, 24] and the real
ﬂight tests should be established to make it possible to run
close to real simulations with virtual intruders. The ﬁnal goal
is to tune the decision thresholds based solely on the knowl-
edge of own aircraft dynamics, camera system parameters,
and possible intruder size and velocity ranges all integrated
in a realistic simulation environment. Second, an appropriate
avoidance strategy based on the dynamic capabilities of the
own aircraft and the estimated collision parameters should
be proposed and tested.
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Supplementary Materials
Supplementary 1. SAA_decision.mp4: successful small (1.27m
wingspan) Ultrastick UAV detection based on the monocu-
lar camera system. Image processing and decision about the
possibility of collision are done onboard the camera-
carrying Sindy UAV (3.5m wingspan). The date of ﬂight
is in October 2016. Successful intruder detection and
decision about the threat in a near scenario (15m horizontal
distance between aircrafts) can be seen. This is a tuning
ﬂight, avoidance is not activated, and altitude diﬀerence
(15m) guarantees safety of the aircraft. This video is related
to the ﬁrst set of ﬂight tests and the selection of thresholds.
Supplementary 2. SAA_success.mp4: successful small (1.27m
wingspan) Ultrastick UAV detection and avoidance based on
the monocular camera system. Image processing, decision
about the possibility of collision, and avoidance maneuver
design are done onboard the camera-carrying Sindy UAV
(3.5m wingspan). The date of ﬂight is in November 2016.
Successful intruder detection, decision about the threat, and
avoidance in a near scenario (15m horizontal distance
between aircrafts) can be seen. This video is related to the
second set of ﬂight tests executed with the tCPAMIN = 2 s and
CPAhMIN = 20 (no. 3) threshold combination.
Supplementary 3. SAA_success_from_ground.mp4: success-
ful small (1.27m wingspan) Ultrastick UAV detection and
avoidance based on the monocular camera system. Image
processing, decision about the possibility of collision, and
avoidance maneuver design are done onboard the camera-
carrying Sindy UAV (3.5m wingspan). The date of ﬂight is
in November 2016. Successful intruder detection, decision
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about the threat and avoidance in near scenarios (15m hori-
zontal distance between aircrafts), and successful decision
about the safe distance in the far scenario (30m horizontal
distance between aircrafts) can be seen. This video is related
to the second set of ﬂight tests executed with the tCPAMIN =
2 s and CPAhMIN = 20 (no. 3) threshold combination and
shows the ground recording of the avoidance case in SAA_
success.mp4 also. First, the camera-carrying aircraft is
shown, second and third two near scenarios are shown where
avoidance is executed, and fourth, a far scenario is shown
where there is no need for avoidance. Note that the aircraft
seem to be very far from each other in all of the scenarios
because of the safety altitude separation.
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